This thread will discuss the planning and operations of the logistical system within the Regio Esercito (R.E.). There have been questions on this topic over the years, so I hope this thread will be a place to try and answer them.
As always comments and corrections are most welcome.
A logistical system must be designed and resourced so units have the supplies/material they need, ideally arriving before they need them. The most efficient system is one where a unit forecast/requests their requirements and those requirements move through the system without stopping until they reach the requesting unit by the time it is needed.
There are two problems that prevent this from happening.
-The item/material isn’t available from the source (e.g. there aren’t any spare tank track blocks available, the factory must make more);
-The transportation system can’t move the requested item when it is needed (there is 40t of supplies waiting to be moved, but there are only enough trucks to transport 20t). The American Red Ball Express in France, 1944 is an example of the transportation problem. The campaigns in A.S. were heavily shaped by the transportation problem.
This thread will not address the first issue of availability. That problem lies in the realm of resources, production, skilled labor, etc. A discussion of Italy’s ability to wage war is a good discussion to have.
The second problem is usually addressed by stockpiling. Armies create depots, units carry spare parts, and also carry an amount of supplies to last them X numbers of days without resupply. It is the requirement to stockpile that creates the cycle of frenzied combat and static lulls. Culmination of an operation happens when the logistical system falls behind in meeting the supply requirements of units such that the units become combat ineffective. The Axis advance after Gazala towards the Nile is a classic example of culmination.
Logistical planning.
Forecasting is at the heart of logistical planning. The planner has two basic considerations that must be achieved:
-Daily consumption. If the unit never moves and never fights, the personnel and animals are consuming food and water every day. Vehicles need fuel. Over time uniforms wear out, personnel and animals get sick, vehicles are driven and break, etc. So the planner must first calculate what are the daily needs of the force than the logistical system must support.
-The consumption created by the planned operation. While the food and water consumption won’t significantly increase, fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, etc. will increase dramatically due to combat.
Both of these types of requirement must be satisfied by the logistical system. In our ideal system, all the food, water, ammunition, etc. is available AND the transportation system can move the daily requirements to the units every day of the operation. The reality it that the daily requirements will require much of the transportation capacity, leaving only the remaining to build up the magazines to support offensive operatives.
As always comments and corrections are most welcome.
A logistical system must be designed and resourced so units have the supplies/material they need, ideally arriving before they need them. The most efficient system is one where a unit forecast/requests their requirements and those requirements move through the system without stopping until they reach the requesting unit by the time it is needed.
There are two problems that prevent this from happening.
-The item/material isn’t available from the source (e.g. there aren’t any spare tank track blocks available, the factory must make more);
-The transportation system can’t move the requested item when it is needed (there is 40t of supplies waiting to be moved, but there are only enough trucks to transport 20t). The American Red Ball Express in France, 1944 is an example of the transportation problem. The campaigns in A.S. were heavily shaped by the transportation problem.
This thread will not address the first issue of availability. That problem lies in the realm of resources, production, skilled labor, etc. A discussion of Italy’s ability to wage war is a good discussion to have.
The second problem is usually addressed by stockpiling. Armies create depots, units carry spare parts, and also carry an amount of supplies to last them X numbers of days without resupply. It is the requirement to stockpile that creates the cycle of frenzied combat and static lulls. Culmination of an operation happens when the logistical system falls behind in meeting the supply requirements of units such that the units become combat ineffective. The Axis advance after Gazala towards the Nile is a classic example of culmination.
Logistical planning.
Forecasting is at the heart of logistical planning. The planner has two basic considerations that must be achieved:
-Daily consumption. If the unit never moves and never fights, the personnel and animals are consuming food and water every day. Vehicles need fuel. Over time uniforms wear out, personnel and animals get sick, vehicles are driven and break, etc. So the planner must first calculate what are the daily needs of the force than the logistical system must support.
-The consumption created by the planned operation. While the food and water consumption won’t significantly increase, fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, etc. will increase dramatically due to combat.
Both of these types of requirement must be satisfied by the logistical system. In our ideal system, all the food, water, ammunition, etc. is available AND the transportation system can move the daily requirements to the units every day of the operation. The reality it that the daily requirements will require much of the transportation capacity, leaving only the remaining to build up the magazines to support offensive operatives.