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Armor
The 1938 manual enumerated clearly defined tasks for the various tank units. It differentiated between tanks that were to be used to support infantry, Celeri, and motorized units and those that were part of the armored division. Supporting tanks gave fire support to the appropriate unit and dealt with strong points and other centers or resistance. Armored divisions were, however, maneuver elements in which the tank was the main weapon. All units in the armored division supported the tanks in their attack. The division either maneuvered against the flank of the enemy or, if that was not feasible, bade an overwhelming attack against his line. Whether the tanks were in an armored division of supporting the infantry, they should be used in mass. Artillery and antitank guns protected the tanks ageist other tanks and against hostile artillery. The instructions for tank units cooperating with Celeri units differed only in their use in reconnaissance. And although they would be used like the infantry tanks in the breeching of the enemy line, it was to enable the Celeri to penetrate the enemy line rather than to destroy the line itself. The new concept did not adequately deal with the problem of tank-versus-tank combat, and even expected Italian tanks to fire main guns while on the move. Italian study of the German Blitzkrieg emphasized that the armored division was designed for flanking attacks in a war of manuever, and not for frontal attacks except in the most exceptional cases.
Infantry
a. Emphasis was placed on training a sharpshooting, agile, light infantry. For additional mobility, Bersaglieri were issued with folding bicycles that could be strapped on their backs.
b. The Italian infantry battalion consisted of three rifle companies and a machine gun company of 12 guns. Each rifle company was divided into three platoons of two squads of 20 men each. One light automatic weapon was allocated per squad but the combat of the squad was not tied to that particular weapon. In the advance, the Italian platoon moved forward in two long squad “worms” with the light machine gun at the head of each. Upon encountering effective enemy fire, the squad riflemen would fan out to the right and left, respectively, seeking to maneuver around each flank, assaulting from both sides if necessary. The squads of 20 were further broken down into fighting groups of 3 to facilitate better control and more flexible movement. Throughout the encounter action, the squad light machine guns, supported by heavy machine guns from the rear, were to keep the enemy pinned down. It was a precept of Italian operations that heavy machinegun suppressive fire was necessary for the infantry to advance at all. Surprisingly, Italian doctrine recommended narrow attack frontages of 50 yards for a platoon and 400 yards for a battalion. Such frontages were, in Liddell Hart’s opinion bound to have a “corpse-producing effect under modern conditions.”
c. A British appraisal: “The principal characteristic of Italian tactics in both theaters Libya and East Africa, has been rigidity. They have remained attached to one principle, the concentration of the greatest possible mass for every task that faces them. In the attack they deploy this mass in line and rely solely on weight on numbers to clear the way.” If stalled, Italian units sought to regain momentum by committing their reserves frontally to reinforce failure. Deficiency of training, land navigation, off-road mobility, and logistics precluded flanking maneuvers and left frontal attack the sole option. Lack of training and leadership prevented them from adapting the German infiltration tactics of 1917-18 that became the heart of every other army’s small unit tactics. In the desert, infantry was capable only of static defense and was poorly equipped even for that. In hilly or mountainous terrain, Italian infantry did remarkably well.*
Manpower
Manpower Pool
Manpower came mostly from peasant stock. The personnel pool was handicapped by many local dialects. The masses were not highly educated. They were not mechanically experienced. Gasoline cost 4 times British prices so Italy had an automotive base of only one motor vehicle to each 130 people. In comparison, France had a ratio of l: 23, Britain 1:32, Germany 1:37, and the US 1:4.4. Italy had, however, a manpower pool with two excellent qualities: the willingness to suffer inadequate clothing, food, and supplies and the willingness, if led with anything approaching competence, to fight and die in conditions that would have caused the armies of the industrial democracies to quail. This manpower was misused as Italy followed the fairly common policy of subordinating infantry to other specialties in quality of personnel.
Conditions of Service
A policy stemming from the 1870’s based on fears of mutiny and regional secession resulted in the members of each regiment being recruited from several different regions and stationed in yet another region. This caused friction and lack of trust because of different regional dialects, values, and customs.
Officers enjoyed better food, uniforms and living conditions. They had enlisted men assigned to them as servants. Little consideration was given to the other ranks. Their rations were universally described as the worst of all armies. Little thought was given to medical attention, mail, leave, and other factors of pride and morale. Italian mobile kitchens were wood burning relics of 1907, this in a treeless desert.
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