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Defense
The Italian teaching was that a commander should concentrate his firepower on such a position whenever it is encountered. It was the Italian view that such action imposed on the commander merely a temporary pause in a “position of arrest”—a mere lull in his sustained offensive movement. Otherwise, Italian tactics discouraged any assumption of a static position.
When the Italians were compelled to assume the defensive in a position of resistance, they hoped to resume the offensive at the earliest possible moment-a doctrine common to most armies. “Defense does not mean giving up the resumption of movement as soon as possible.” The main line of resistance was removed as far as possible from the enemy’s artillery fire, and the Italians endeavored to establish a “ zone of security” with a depth ranging from 2000 to 3500 yards. In this area, utilizing all footholds that the terrain may offer, they organized holding positions. These delivered long-range fire, especially along the easiest routes of penetration, with a view to wearing the enemy down before coming to grips with him.
Principles of Employment
INFANTRY
A. General- The Italian ideal of the employment of infantry presupposed the possibility of an attack undivided into principal and auxiliary actions. Supposedly sufficient elasticity would be maintained to direct the effort to those points where success appeared best assured upon initial contact.
B. Infantry division-The infantry division was the basic large combat unit. Its maneuverability was sacrificed to the development of increased attack capability and the ability to undertake deep penetration of enemy positions. It had a fixed table of organization and was considered to be an indivisible unit. Whenever its strength required increasing for accomplishing its mission, superior commands were expected to assign the required additional equipment and personnel.
C. The binary infantry division organization was adopted on the eve of war. It was born in the Ethiopian War and was to create a mobile infantry force in which one division would fix the enemy or begin to advance and the second division would bound forward to launch attack and/or push on. The binary infantry division was, by doctrine, supposed to be capable only of frontal attack. Maneuver was the prerogative only of army corps. The divisions were to function as attack columns to create and exploit any tactical opportunity. Control both of the movement of individual divisions and of the medium caliber guns was retained by corps headquarters. This flaw should have been realized early in the attacks against France in 1940. Italian units dashed forward into the killing zone of French artillery and were stopped with cruel casualties. The Army Staff misinterpreted the failure and blamed inadequate artillery support rather than on an operational concept that assigned to poorly trained infantry tasks of offensive deep penetrations that no infantry in the world could accomplish in the face of an unshaken defense. In practice, superiority of numbers only produced superior numbers of dead, wounded or captured.
D. Motorized divisions were originally formed to work with an armored division. They also operated with the Celere divisions for strategic reconnaissance or as a general advance guard often preceded by a light and very fast force of motorcyclists, light tanks or other units on observation missions.
Artillery
A. General-It was planned that Italian artillery be divided into echelons: the first to operate in direct support of the infantry battalions of the first echelon; the second to act generally as a reserve for the purpose of lateral extension of the line or depth. Depth in echelon was sought for the purpose of increasing shock and penetration, almost to the point of risking the maintenance of a sufficiently strong front.
B. Principles of employment:
(1) Prompt intervention in response to tactical necessities.
(2) Close co-operation with other arms.
(3) Violent action in mass and by surprise.
(4) Co-ordination of the action of the various artillery echelons in order that the effects of fire produce the total results desired in the general concept of the battle, with a single final purpose- that of facilitating the action of infantry.
(5) Elasticity of organization permitting not only the maneuvering of fire rapidly, but also the following of the action and its support with the movement of the batteries, particularly when it assumes a character of velocity.
(6) Artillery is useful only if the ammunition supply is assured.
(7) Observation is essential for artillery. This last mentioned principle was possibly the most important, for to achieve observation at all times Italian artillery was often situated well forward and resorted to direct laying far more frequently than other armed forces did.
C. Division artillery-The division artillery commander regulated the employment of artillery except in counter battery and interdiction. Decentralization of command for these functions was designed to expedite rapid and effective action, and thus contribute to the desired war of movement.
D. Method of employment-The employment of artillery by the Italians was quite normal, and the only feature worthy of note was the tendency to site the bulk of their artillery well forward. Artillery personnel earned a reputation for good shooting and displayed considerable courage under heavy fire or in direct attack. In many cases artillery firing over open sights was used against attacking tank or infantry. In defensive situations roving pieces were sent far forward of the main defense area in order to force the enemy to deploy and to execute counter battery fire Alpine artillerymen were highly skilled in the manhandling of pack artillery. The highly centralized Italian artillery actually did better than their German allies against Montgomery’s 1918 style “set-piece” tactics in North Africa.
E. The artillery arm was spread through out the army and was classified as divisional, corps, or army. There also existed ad hoc formations known as raggruppamenti (tactical organizations of flexible size and mission), which had no fixed establishment.
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