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Combined Action
A primary element of the Italian doctrine was the combined employment of various arms, particularly infantry and artillery. Italian infantry was designed to be used in small, flexible, highly maneuverable units of great firepower. Each forward echelon, upon achieving a breakthrough was followed by reinforcements for purposes of exploitation. Mobility and maneuverability comprised the fundamental characteristics of Italian artillery. Closely allied to the artillery’s mission to support the infantry were the secondary missions of engaging in counter battery firing and of providing antitank protection. Cavalry maneuver was mounted, but combat could have been mounted or dismounted. Mechanization of the cavalry resulted in increased mobility and firepower. This added, for the first time, the element of fire mass to the common cavalry missions of reconnaissance and exploitation. Italian engineers, although armed, were more concerned with normal engineer functions and less concerned with combat than in other modern armies. Chief features were: fast moving divisions, designed for exploitation and reconnaissance; tank brigades, designed for penetration, encirclement, and exploitation, and motorized divisions, designed for rapid movement over a wide range and for the reinforcement of mechanized or fast moving units. Surprise, speed, intensity, sustained action and flexibility of plan allowing for unforeseen contingencies were seen as the basic factors for a successful action. Staff studies and war plans laid very little stress on the defensive, the assumption being that an offensive against its soldiers was a remote possibilities. It was discovered that applying theories was somewhat more difficult than developing them. Organization was, however, based upon this “Rapid Decision” doctrine.
Reconnaissance and Intelligence
Intelligence was a relatively neglected aspect of operational planning, and commanders in the field tended to make insufficient use of intelligence resources. Until 1941, the army failed to recognize the need for specialized reconnaissance units to ensure surprise, to avoid it from the enemy, and to find opportunities to exploit. Italian units lacked armored cars with radios to keep commanders appraised on the locations and activities of enemy units. Air Force reconnaissance support was poorly coordinated.
Security
The Italians aimed at security through offense and penetration. Intelligence, camouflage, and similar means of attaining security were regarded as preliminaries to offensive penetration. Security measures were not merely supposed to guard against surprise by the enemy, but were also supposed to be so planned as to enable the Italian commander to inflict upon the enemy a surprise of his own. Italian leaders were urged not to let security measures betray them into undue caution, which might slow up the forward drive of an action. On the contrary, daring was thought to be quite as important as security. Nevertheless the Italians kept a somewhat greater distance between the advance guard and main body than the German did.
Meeting Engagements
A. General-Meeting engagements, as distinct from mere preliminary engagements or patrol activities to test the enemy’s strength a and determine his weak points, were regarded by the Italians as a matter of rapid aggressive action. It was believed such engagements would occur only in the case of relatively small forces, for Italian military theory denied the possibility of surprise in modern warfare, at least on any considerable scale. The Italians ‘did not admit that a sudden and unplanned clash could occur between sizable forces.” In other words they expected proper reconnaissance to always reveal the presence of large enemy units.
B. Doctrine-The Italians believed that their system successfully combined the best features of both French and German tactics. It was supposed to provide for “both conceptions-planned collision and swift and precise intervention with decidedly aggressive behavior.” The commander was urged to “take the initiative in operations and attack with decision, seeking victory in swiftness of movements in direction, in immediacy and power of impact.”
Attack and Pursuit
Italian ideas of attack and pursuit were much like those of any other modern army, though the emphasis placed on the offensive almost recalls the pre-1914 doctrines of the French Colonel de Grandmaison. The 1940 Italian doctrine provided that the attack was to be recklessly pressed, was never to halt, and was to “overcome the resistance with continuity of effort.” Initiative, violence and audacity were urged. As for the “continuity of effort,” one Greek tactical authority with much experience in the Albanian campaign against Italy declared that an obvious characteristic of all Italian attacks was their extreme brevity and the failure of officers rather than men to follow through. It became almost a proverb in the Greek army that an Italian attack was certain to flag after the first 20 minutes. A Greek unit, which had successfully sustained an attack for that length of time usually, felt that it had for all practical purposes already won. This was not, of course, what the Italian tacticians had taught. “The Italian military doctrine of the present,” wrote Major Umberto Mescia in 1939, “reaffirms the reasoning which was Caesar’s and Machiavelli’s; the offensive, because only the offensive can bring victory. There is a return to the Roman concept, to the Latin and Italian spirit, because those qualities which bring success-a sense of responsibility and the willingness to meet danger-are particularly Italian, manly in courage and daring in spirit, ready to overcome difficulties. To take the offensive means to attack, to go forward, to force one’s will on the enemy, and in this direction, the mental, moral, and material preparation of all is turned toward an ever greater formation of the offensive consciousness.” The actual performance of the Italian Army often fell somewhat short of this high standard.
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