Maritza/Procida - what happened to crews and how discovered?

[Andreas]

During the night of 25 November 1941 the German tankers Maritza and Procida fell victim to Force K after failing to receive the order to return to harbour.

All I could find about the crews was that they took to the boats once the outgunned escort retreated and before the tankers were sunk. Were they picked up by the British or the escort? If not, did they make their way to e.g. Crete?

Also, was this convoy picked up by ULTRA or was it really discovered by a reconnaissance plane (instead of the reconnaissance plane being sent later to cover ULTRA), as indicated in USMM 'La Difesa del Trafico' (the map of the engagement is one of the few pages I could copy).

Thanks a lot in advance for any help!

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

I have now translated the report by the escort commander on the engagement.

All the best

Andreas

2. Report by the Head of Escort Section Procida and Maritza convoy, Captain of Frigate Francesco Mimbelli

Extract from the report of Captain of Frigate Mimbelli regarding the engagement of Destroyer Escort Lupo on 24 November 1941

Left Out

b) The fire of the due Destroyer Escorts, considering the particularly difficult conditions under which it was conducted (frequent change of approach to avoid bracketing by the enemy; reduced visibility by smoke-screen; impossibility for Lupo to measure range etc.etc.), had a fairly satisfying result.
As was already told, an Arethusa class cruiser was hit once or twice by Lupo. Previously, this same cruiser had already been hit by Cassiopea shortly before.
In total 304 rounds of 100/47 were expended: 116 by Lupo and 188 by Cassiopea.
Perfect in every regard the performance of the munitions and guns: not one dud round.
Less well however was the performance of the smoke generators on the two Destroyer Escorts, which generated smoke alright, but not of the density and opaqueness that could have been wished for.
c) After sighting, the enemy tried to disturb our radio communications on the naval frequency (m.55) by emitting a constant signal for several minutes.
This probably aimed to stop or blanket our signal of discovery, and to prevent indirectly the assembly of naval or air forces in our support.
Despite the efforts by the enemy, our signal of discovery was promptly received by the radio station of Naval Command South East.
d) The tactical conduct of combat by the English was in my view based on not running risks. Instead of aiming for the complete destruction of the enemy forces, which would not have been difficult to achieve given the great disparity in forces and the measurable distance in speed, they contented themselves with only sinking the steamers in the care of the Destroyer Escorts, in a way that could not cause significant damage to their own units
The enemy destroyers remained all the time rigidly close to the cruisers and did never attempt a gamble, even though their higher speed would have allowed them to.
When the two Destroyer Escorts had to leave the field of action, they renounced to pursue, or at the least pursue as far as possible.
The fire of the English was as always heavy, but I can not say I was favourably impressed by the precision and the speed. It must of course be said that a Destroyer Escort taking high-speed evasive actions is anything but a simple target.
e) For the part concerning the conduct of the action on our side, I maybe allowed to observe that I missed the information from aerial reconnaissance about the approach of the enemy forces. If I had known of the approach of the English division towards me just a few hours before, I could most likely have evaded contact until sunset, and then return quickly to the Morea coast.
When sighting the enemy forces I quickly understood that the steamers were practically condemned: we missed two hours to sunset; there was no support group nearby; the coast was too far. Only one hope remained for me: that of an intervention by German bombers. It was above all that hope which made me look for delaying, for as long as possible, the approach march of the enemy units and the destructive effect of their fire on the steamers.
I had to renounce twice to conduct the attack to the finish with Lupo because the enemy, free of any restriction to maneuver, by turning bow to me, immediately conducted the counter-maneuver that is at the same time easiest and most effective.
When at 16.30 hours I saw that nothing could be done to rescue the Maritza and the Procida, and that remaining close to them would lead only to the loss of the two Destroyer Escorts, I decided to abandon the two steamers with their precious cargo and their brave crews.
Never before have I had to take such a painful decision which is in such contrast, at least apparently, to that which should be the creed of every torpedo commander: aggressiveness. I had to shut up the sentiment and obey the cold reasoning which ordered me to save Lupo and Cassiopea for other endeavours.
CHIEF OF THE SQUADRON
Captain of Frigate
FRANCESCO MIMBELLI

[Andreas]

Does anybody know about the further career of Capt. Mimbelli, and whether he suffered any consequences for his conduct of the action?

All the best

Andreas

[Lupo Solitario]

Traslated and slightly resumed with some addition from Italian navy website http://www.marina.difesa.it

Capitano di Fregata Francesco Mimbelli

Born at Livorno, April 16, 1903. Joins Naval Academy in October 1918, named Guardiamarina October 1923. Embarked in successive times on gunships Caboto and Carlotto in China Sea and named Sottotenente di Vascello on last unit. Back in Italy in 1926, follows the Upper Course at Livorno, specializing E.C. and given to Ministery of Navy as aide to Naval Subsecretary. Tenente di Vascello in 1928 becomes Aide to Minister of Navy. Member in 1930 of Italian Delegation at London Naval Conference.

Back to Italy embarks on Trieste cruiser. After, promoted Capitano di Corvetta in 1937, takes command of a torpediniera with which takes part to Albania occupation in 1939. At the eve of WWII is again at Ministery of Navy. On request, is given the command of torpediniera Lupo with which, the night on May 22, 1941, escorting a fisherboat convoy transporting german troops moving on Crete, had an hard night fighting against a british cruiser group, reaching in disengaging and recovering in harbour with an hardly hit ship.

In March 1942 receives the command of 4th Flottilia MAS in the Black Sea, participating to the conquest of Sevastopol and gaining the german Golden Eagle Cross.

Promoted Capitano di Vascello and named commander of MAS and MTB Flottilia Group made many brave actions along calabrian coasts. From May 1st 1945 to May 11th 1946 was CO of battleship Vittorio Veneto and from October 1946 to april 1947 of cruiser Garibaldi.

Promoted Contrammiraglio in July 1948 had in 1951 the command of 3rd Naval Division.
From april 1953 was at AFMED Malta. Named commander of Livorno Naval Academy in December 1953, promoted Ammiraglio di Divisione in February 1954, becomes commander of 2nd Naval Division with cruiser Duca degli Abruzzi as flagship.

Ammiraglio di Squadra in November 1957, is named CO of Adriatic naval department and commander of the fleet from September 1959 to april 1961. Retired for health causes in april 1962 and definitely in April 1964.

Dead at Rome January 26, 1978

Awards:
- Great Cross Knight of the Italian Republic
- Gold Medal for Military Braveness (egean sea, may 1941)
- 3 Silver Medals for Military Braveness (east Med, January 1941; east Med, November 1941; Capo Spartivento august 1943)
- 5 Bronze Medals for Military Braveness (Mediterrean sea, june 1940-41; Castelrosso February 1941; Mediterrean sea, june 1941-42; east med January 1942; mediterrean sea june 1942-september 1943)
- 1 War Cross for Military Braveness (egean sea, October 1941)
- Named 3 times on war bulletins
- Named 1 time on Navy Order Sheet
- German Iron Cross of 1st Class
- German Iron Cross of 2nd Class

In 1990 an Italian Navy DDG has been named after him

[Andreas]

Many thanks Lupo.

That would be a 'no' then, regarding my question. I did not realise he commanded Lupo in the engagement near Crete.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Does anyone know how many tons of fuel went to the bottom with the two tankers?

All the best

Andreas

[Dili]

Procida and Maritza weren't tankers but cargo ships. i think they could only transport fuel in barrels and such.

Post edit: I am trying to find pictures of this ships. Anyone have them?

[Andreas]

Correct regarding the type of vessels.

I now also know that all the crewmembers were lost, including the members of the German navy's Bordlflak company.

All the best

Andreas

[Dili]

No pics or drawings Andreas? I am collecting pics of Mediterranean civilians and military ships and i am missing this ones.

[Andreas]

Das soll Maritza sein:



Alles Gute

Andreas

[Dili]

Danke