August 25, 1939
FÜHRER: I am replying to your letter which has just been delivered to me by Ambassador won Mackensen.
(1) Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve of that completely. His Excellency Marshal Goring
will tell you that in the discussion which I had with him last April I stated that a rapprochement
between Germany and Russia was necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.
(2) I consider it desirable to try to avoid a break or any deterioration in relations with Japan,
since that would result in Japan's return to a position close to the democratic powers. With this in
mind, I have telegraphed to Tokyo and it appears that after the first surprise of public opinion
passed, a better psychological attitude prevails.
(3) The Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and can alter the position of Turkey, which accepted the
English loan, but which has not yet signed the treaty of alliance. A new attitude on the part of
Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean.
(4) As regards Poland I have complete understanding for the German position and for the fact that
such strained relations cannot continue permanently.
(5) As for the practical position of Italy, in case of a military collision, my point of view is as
follows:
If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict remains localized, Italy will afford Germany every form of
political and economic assistance which is requested.
If Germany attacks, and Poland's allies open a counterattack against Germany, I want to let you know
in advance that it would be better if I did not take the initiative in military activities in view of
the present situation of Italian war preparations, which we have repeatedly previously explained to
you, Führer, and to Herr von Ribbentrop.
Our intervention can, therefore, take place at once if Germany delivers to us immediately the military
supplies and the raw materials to resist the attack which the French and English especially would
direct against us.
At our meetings the war was envisaged for after 1942 and at such time I would have been ready on land,
on sea, and in the air according to the plans which had been arranged.
I am also of the opinion that the purely military preparations which have already been undertaken and
the others which will be entered upon in Europe and Africa will serve to immobilize important French
and British forces.
I consider it my implicit duty as a true friend to tell you the whole truth and inform you about the
actual situation in advance. Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences for us all. This is my
point of view and since within a short time I must summon the highest governmental bodies of the
realm, I ask you to let me know yours as well.
MUSSOLINI
Article Courtesy: Eddy Cassin via Avalon Project
