| Non-Divisional (GHQ) Units |
The Italian army, like all other armies, utilized non-divisional units at Army and Corps level and to
reinforce certain divisions when needed. Orders of battle reveal the existence of such units as:
Grenadier (infantry) regiments, cavalry regiments and squadrons, Black Shirt battalions and legions,
medium artillery regiments, Bersaglieri regiments and battalions, an armored brigade, battalions and
companies, and machinegun battalions. There were also antitank companies, colonial infantry brigades,
heavy artillery battalions, and batterys, mountain artillery battalions, Alpini battalions, and a
camel artillery battery.
During the war Assault Pioneers known as “Guastatori” (destroyers) were organized into battalions.
They were patterned after similar German units and the Assault Engineer School was organized by a Col.
Steiner in Mar ’40. Formations included Corps engineer regiments, mining regiments, pontoon regiments
, railway regiment, workshop units, and carrier pigeon lofts. Also included were bridging companies,
pontoon battalions, a ropeway battalion, a balloonist section, an electrical mechanics’ company, a
firefighting company, a mining battalion, a camouflage battalion, and others.
Chemical Troops
Were responsible for chemical warfare in all forms. Organized into the Chemical Regiment, a number of
separate companies and platoons assigned to corps and divisions as required. There were chemical
battalions and flame throwing battalions. The war brought the establishment of chemical mortar groups.
They made no use of chemical warfare, but had planned to use the 81mm mortar, artillery shells,
toxic smoke candles. Truck-borne and knapsack sprayers were devoted for decontamination.
Commissariat Service
Commissariat Service distributed supplies in bulk to the tactical organizations. Where line soldiers
handled storage and issue. The provision of rations, forage, clothing equipment, barracks and fuel,
and the removal and recovery of these materials when damaged or unserviceable was also under the
Commissariat jurisdiction.
Transport Service
Transport Service was divided into rail, water, air, and ordinary transport units. Ordinary included
motor vehicle, wagon, pack and cable railway. Motor transport groups were divided into two or more
companies, which were then divided into sections of 24 vehicles each.
There also existed ad hoc formations known as raggrummenti (tactical organizations of flexible
size and mission) that had no fixed establishment. One, for example, was made up of four tank
battalions; another of five colonial infantry battalions.
The Frontier Guard was part of the quasi military/quasi police Royal Carabineri. They were light
forces charged with border security. Organization varied.
Organization was complicated by the existence of Fascist Militia, Royal Carabineri, Railway Militia,
Port Militia, Post and Telegraph Militia, Forestry Militia, Highway Militia, Antiaircraft and Coast
Defense Militia, Frontier Militia, and the Royal Finance Guard. Most of these militiamen proved to be
somewhat more suited to strutting about in fancy regalia that in serving as soldiers.
The war of rapid decision required deep penetration into the enemy rear; but Italian tactics were
unsuited to producing that penetration. Prewar doctrine also apparently had nothing to say about
the subject of surprise, and assigned rapid exploitation of opportunities to soft-skinned motorized
forces and to armored divisions equipped with the 3.5-ton tankettes.
Antitank
Artillery had the primary responsibility for antitank protection. They were supposed to use field
guns in this role. Infantry had a secondary responsibility. Infantry weapons included the infantry
support guns, antitank companies, and a rather hopeful antitank rifle.
Armor
The 1938 manual enumerated clearly defined tasks for the various tank units. It differentiated between
tanks that were to be used to support infantry, Celeri, and motorized units and those that were part
of the armored division. Supporting tanks gave fire support to the appropriate unit and dealt with
strong points and other centers or resistance. Armored divisions were, however, manuever elements
in which the tank was the main weapon. All units in the armored division supported the tanks in
their attack. The division either maneuvered against the flank of the enemy or, if that was not
feasible, bade an overwhelming attack against his line. Whether the tanks were in an armored
division of supporting the infantry, they should be used in mass. Artillery and antitank guns
protected the tanks ageist other tanks and against hostile artillery. The instructions for tank
units cooperating with Celeri units differed only in their use in reconnaissance. And although
they would be used like the infantry tanks in the breeching of the enemy line, it was to enable
the Celeri to penetrate the enemy line rather than to destroy the line itself. The new concept
did not adequately deal with the problem of tank-versus-tank combat, and even expected Italian
tanks to fire main guns while on the move. Italian study of the German Blitzkrieg emphasized that
the armored division was designed for flanking attacks in a war of manuever, and not for frontal
attacks except in the most exceptional cases.
Infantry
a. Emphasis was placed on training a sharpshooting, agile, light infantry. For additional mobility,
Bersaglieri were issued with folding bicycles that could be strapped on their backs.
b. The Italian infantry battalion consisted of three rifle companies and a machinegun company of 12
guns. Each rifle company was divided into three platoons of two squads of 20 men each. One light
automatic weapon was allocated per squad but the combat of the squad was not tied to that particular
weapon. In the advance, the Italian platoon moved forward in two long squad “worms” with the light
machinegun at the head of each. Upon encountering effective enemy fire, the squad riflemen would
fan out to the right and left, respectively, seeking to maneuver around each flank, assaulting from
both sides if necessary. The squads of 20 were further broken down into fighting groups of 3 to
facilitate better control and more flexible movement. Throughout the encounter action, the squad
light machineguns, supported by heavy machine guns from the rear, were to keep the enemy pinned
down. It was a precept of Italian operations that heavy machinegun suppressive fire was necessary
for the infantry to advance at all. Surprisingly, Italian doctrine recommended narrow attack frontages
of 50 yards for a platoon and 400 yards for a battalion. Such frontages were, in Liddell Hart’s
opinion bound to have a “corpse-producing effect under modern conditions.”
c. A British appraisal: “The principal characteristic of Italian tactics in both theaters Libya and
East Africa, has been rigidity. They have remained attached to one principle, the concentration of
the greatest possible mass for every task that faces them. In the attack they deploy this mass in line
and rely solely on weight on numbers to clear the way.” If stalled, Italian units sought to regain
momentum by committing their reserves frontally to reinforce failure. Deficiency of training, land
navigation, off-road mobility, and logistics precluded flanking maneuvers and left frontal attack the
sole option. Lack of training and leadership prevented them from adapting the German infiltration
tactics of 1917-18 that became the heart of every other army’s small unit tactics. In the desert,
infantry was capable only of static defense and was poorly equipped even for that. In hilly or
mountainous terrain, Italian infantry did remarkably well.*
Manpower Pool
Manpower came mostly from peasant stock. The personnel pool was handicapped by many local dialects.
The masses were not highly educated. They were not mechanically experienced. Gasoline cost 4 times
British prices so Italy had an automotive base of only one motor vehicle to each 130 people. In
comparison, France had a ratio of l: 23, Britain 1:32, Germany 1:37, and the US 1:4.4. Italy had,
however, a manpower pool with two excellent qualities: the willingness to suffer inadequate clothing,
food, and supplies and the willingness, if led with anything approaching competence, to fight and die
in conditions that would have caused the armies of the industrial democracies to quail. This manpower
was misused as Italy followed the fairly common policy of subordinating infantry to other specialties
in quality of personnel.
Conditions of Service
A policy stemming from the 1870’s based on fears of mutiny and regional secession resulted in the
members of each regiment being recruited from several different regions and stationed in yet another
region. This caused friction and lack of trust because of different regional dialects, values, and
customs.
Officers enjoyed better food, uniforms and living conditions. They had enlisted men assigned to them as
servants. Little consideration was given to the other ranks. Their rations were universally
described as the worst of all armies. Little thought was given to medical attention, mail, leave,
and other factors of pride and morale. Italian mobile kitchens were wood burning relics of 1907,
this in a treeless desert.
Rotation
(From an archive)” British Command, even in quiet periods, did not keep its units in the front line
for more than twelve days and, after that, gave them four days’ complete rest in the rear. On the
other hand, our soldiers had for months not had any relief from front-line duty; rest was almost
unknown to them, as was also the system of relieving for home leave units that were tired and worn
from many months of exhausting life and combat in the desert. There were divisions amount the soldiers
that had been fighting for more than twenty-four months in the front line, and that had greatly
exceeded the theoretical 200 days which American and British experts have set as the maximum limit
of physical and psychological resistance in battle, after which, according to them, the soldier
becomes exhausted and militarily inefficient.
If the Italian soldier, deprived of means and exhausted has retreated before the superior numbers,
strength and buoyant morale organization of the enemy-if he has retreated it is because the limits of
human endurance have been exceeded and he could not do otherwise.”
The Italian army was unspectacular and not overly successful, so the individual courage of the Italian
soldier was emphasized to give a sense of national pride.
Training
Units were trained for service in the type of terrain in which they were most likely to serve. Great
stress was placed on cooperation of different arms, especially between infantry and artillery. For a
war of movement, infantry command was greatly decentralized with platoons and sometimes squads acting
largely on their own initiative during offensives.
The integration of all arms was desired, but inadequate technology and training limited the
effectiveness of cooperation. In the offense, artillery was frequently unable to cover or communicate
with the infantry. In the defense, support was generally more effective.
Personnel assigned to support and headquarters units were not given any infantry training whatsoever.
They made absolutely no effort to provide all-round defensive perimeters to protect against raids or
penetrations. Consequently, service troops were easily routed by minimal enemy forces.
The instructions of the Chief of Staff to a commander sent to Libya in 1937 cautioned him “not to do
too much training.” It was assumed that initiative and individual valor counted for far more than
training. OJT was the norm…even for such duties as tank drivers and gunners. The officer corps store
of talent and experience was so diluted and so outdated that even training attempted did not
accomplish a great deal.
Some training, like that of the Bersaglieri, was quite impressive. Liddell Hart gained the distinct
impression that the Italian military was training “an army of human panthers,” the physical training
of the soldiers being ‘far superior to anything ever seen.” He described the marching endurance of
the Italian soldier as “astonishing.”
Officers were overage. Promotions were under a strict seniority system. Officer pay and benefits
were high- at the expense of junior officer training. This lack of training resulted in over
supervision. Bloated staffs attempted to justify their existence. Older commanders led to “atavistic
intellectual narrowness’.” The proportionately high budget for regular officers also cut funds
for weapons, vehicles, and even economized at the expense of junior officer development.
Roattas Evaluation of Officers
In a wartime study, Gen Roatta (himself a major contributor to the problem) found the following
deficiencies in the Italian officer corps:
1. Lack of command authority. Timidity.
2. Inadequate technical knowledge
3. Poor understanding of communications equipment
4. Poor map reading and use of the compass
5. Lack of knowledge about field fortifications and fields of fire
6. Poor physical conditioning
7. Total administrative ignorance
Some effort was made to correct these deficiencies in junior officers. No such effort was made to
improve senior ranks.
A German staff officer evaluated Italian staff work: “The command structure is…pedantic and slow.
The absence of sufficient communication equipment renders the links to the subordinate units
precarious. The consequence is that the leadership is poorly informed about the friendly situation
and has no capacity to redeploy swiftly. The working style of the staff is schematic, static, and
come cases lacking in precision.”
The overabundance of older senior officers cultivated an atmosphere of intellectual rigidity and lack
of curiosity. The Army began with two mistaken assumptions it had held fiercely through the interwar
period: that the Alps were the most likely theater of war and that numbers were decisive. The first
assumption fell away in 1940. The second, despite repeated demonstrations of its fallaciousness,
determined Italian doctrine and force structure…and hence use of technology…until 1943.
Gen Bastico evaluated reserve officers: “Divisional commanders were unanimous in informing me that
while subalterns, apart from a few exceptions, are rendering good service-even when they come from
auxiliary sources, the same cannot be said for the majors and captains recalled from the reserve.
These latter in general are too old, and even if they have the will and spirit of sacrifice they
lack energy and the capacity necessary for carrying out their duty. Also, nearly all of them reached
their rank by successive promotions, the fruit of very brief periods of service. They were also
unanimous in lamenting the fact that these officers, nearly all of them, come unprepared and
therefore unsuited for the command of their units, or they suffer from congenital illnesses and
after the briefest stay they have to be removed-because of professional incapacity or poor health.”
Senior officers were not culled after WWI, and the junior officers were gutted during the 20’s
by the thousands in a cost-cutting move. Italy was faced with a choice then to either cut the
generals (and their higher salaries) or the lower officers and Italy made the wrong choice.
Of junior officers Gen Claudio Trezzani observed, “As long as it’s a question of risking one’s skin,
they are admirable, when, instead, they have to open their eyes, think, decide in cold blood, they are
hopeless. In terms of reconnaissance, movement to contact, preparatory fire, coordinated movement,
and so on, they are practically illiterat.”
Officer Casualties
During the war Italy lost 68 Generals, 84 colonels, 10 admirals, 30 naval captains, 11 air force
generals, 22 air force colonels. “Surely the sacrifice of one’s life imposes respect, but it is not
a measure of professional ability.” Prof Lucio Ceva
Evaluation
Rommel: “The Italian soldier is disciplined, sober, an excellent worker and an example to the
Germans in preparing dug-in positions. If attacked he reacts well. He lacks, however, a spirit
of attack, and above all, proper training. Many operations did not succeed solely because of a
lack of coordination between artillery and heavy arms fire and the advance of the infantry. The
lack of adequate means of supply and service, and the insufficient number of motor vehicles and
tanks, is such that during some movements Italian sections arrived at their posts incomplete.
Lack of means of transport and service in Italian units is such that especially in the bigger units,
they cannot be maintained as a reserve and one cannot count on their quick intervention.”
