The Italian army showed a great deal of imagination in tailoring divisions for special uses. Much of
this effort failed to reach fruition because events overtook the organizations before they could be
accomplished.
Infantry Divisions
a. Adoption, on the eve of the war, of the Divisione Bineria increased peacetime strength from 70+
to 90+ divisions. This resulted only in an increase of slots and staffs, not an increase of combat
power. Mussolini also liked his numbers. He bragged of an army of “eight million bayonets.” It
apparently never occurred to him that more that bayonets might be needed. Only two divisions of
grenadiers retained the old three-regiment organization. A staff study claimed, “A single
motorized division, even for defense and occupation missions has the capability of four infantry
divisions while it eats only one fourth as much and requires only a fourth as much transport
from Italy.
b. The concept was born of the Ethiopian War and was called “binary” owing to the incorporation
of only two infantry regiments instead of the old three-regiment organization. A Fascist Militia
legion of two battalions was attached to some infantry divisions partly to increase the number
of infantry in the division and partly to include Black Shirt troops with regular Army units.
The legion was, however, described as an independent unit to be used as shock troops. During the
Albanian campaign the weakness of the binary division became evident. Divisions that had
suffered heavy losses had to be reformed with whatever infantry was available, sometimes
even by merging with another division.
c. The table of organization of an infantry division provided for two reserve battalions. In
practice, however, reinforcement was from reserve units, which were held under GHQ to the theater
of operations for allotment to units as required, or from the depot of the division.
d. The table of organization called for a 81mm mortar battalion of 27 81mm mortars (three
companies of 9 mortars each).
e. A few divisions were given machine-gun battalions.
Assault and Landing Divisions
The assault and landing division, adopted in 1941 in anticipation of the intended invasion of Malta,
assumed a special organization different from that of an ordinary infantry division. Increased mobility
was obtained by the decentralization of heavy support weapons (antitank guns and 81mm mortars) from
regimental to battalion control and of light support weapons (machineguns and 45mm mortars from
battalion to company control in late 1941 and affected three ordinary infantry divisions. Expanded
engineer and assault engineer assets (a battalion of each) as well as a rock climber battalion were
added to this type of division for combined operations. The invasion never took place, and the units
were used as ordinary infantry. Three divisions were effected.
Motorized Infantry Divisions
Italian Motorized infantry divisions were like those in most other countries, designed to work
together with the armored divisions. Two were pre-war formations, part of the Armored corps that
also comprised two armored divisions. Three others were wartime conversions. As Italy could not
support the number of motorized divisions needed for the mobile warfare in North Africa, semi-
motorized divisions were created instead. Organization of these units was similar to that of
ordinary infantry divisions except that the regiments had only two battalions instead of three and
had additional motorized transport. TO&E charts are quite sketchy regarding the amount and type of
vehicles provided and leave the impression that whatever was available was used.
Truck-Borne Infantry Division
a. The “European” type or "Divisione Fanteria Autotransportabile,” or lorried infantry divisions,
were an attempt at solving the problems the Italians had with a lack of motor vehicles to motorize
their infantry divisions to the level demanded by modern warfare. The eight divisions differed
little from ordinary infantry divisions except that they may have had motorized artillery, no
Black Shirt legion, and two divisional mortar battalions in the field if not on paper. The motor
transport needed to carry it entirely was not allotted to the division but was drawn when
required from the Intendance at corps level. The division retained a good proportion of animal
transport, which enabled it to operate, when grounded, in “Horsed” columns. The animal transport
could theoretically be lifted and transported by rail or motor transport.
b. The “North African” type or "Divisione Autotransportabile Tipo A(frica) S(ettentriole),” semi-
motorized Italian infantry divisions, were organized for the North African theatre as a stop-gap
measure, when the Italians did not have enough motor vehicles, nor gasoline, to convert them into
actual motorized divisions. Ten divisions are thought to have been raised, but the number is a
bit uncertain.
Mountain Infantry Divisions
a. Certain infantry divisions were designated as mountain infantry in an attempt to better adapt
regular infantry divisions for operations in mountainous regions. These differed from Alpini
divisions and were infantry divisions specially adapted for mountain warfare. They had the
ordinary composition of an infantry division, but had more animal transport. All the guns
of the artillery regiment could be transported in horse-drawn wagonloads or on pack animals.
Personnel were not specially trained in mountain warfare, but were for the most part recruited
from mountain districts. The division was not intended to operate at a higher altitude than
2000m (6,500’).
b. As the war went on, and there was no need for infantry adapted to mountain
warfare, attempts were made to convert most of the nine divisions to truck-borne infantry divisions.
Alpini Divisions
a. General-The Alpine division, designed to operate above 6000’, was different from the mountain
infantry division. It was an elite unit made up of men native to Italy’s mountainous regions, and
was ideally suited for waging war in the Alps surrounding Italy’s northern borders, The standard
of physique and training was high and the artillerymen were expert in the manhandling of pack
artillery. The regiments had their own detachments of artillery, engineers, and auxiliary services
permanently attached. This made the regiment self-supporting and capable of independent action
for a considerable period. Decentralization did not stop at regiments; Alpini battalions and
companies were detached from their parent units and regrouped with artillery units into
regroupments. This procedure was made easier by the existence of independent transport right
down to company organization.
b. Composition. The Alpine division consisted of a headquarters, two Alpine regiments, one Alpine
artillery regiment, one mixed engineer battalion, one chemical warfare company, one supply
section, and one medical section, decentralized to regiments. The table of organization provided
for two reserve battalions (one for each infantry regiment). In practice replacements were drawn
from the depot of the division as required. No allowance was therefore made for reserve
battalions. Pack mules provided transportation. A large sanitation unit was required due to
disposal problems in rocky terrain.
c. They saw little combat in that role though. There was some use in the invasions of France in
1940 and Yugoslavia in 1941. After that they mostly performed occupation duties. Three of them
were sent to the Soviet Union to fight in the Caucasus Mountains, but instead ended up in the
unending Russian Steppe, where they were ill suited and were virtually annihilated. There were
six Alpini divisions.
Mobile Cavalry (Celere) Divisions
The major cavalry/Bersaglieri operations at the end of the war (WWI) against a collapsing enemy in
difficult terrain had been very successful. This final campaign had been the one that greatly
influenced Italian planners. The main components of the Celere divisions were two horsed cavalry
regiments and one cyclist Bersaglieri regiment. The cavalry regiments were virtually mounted infantry.
The Bersaglieri regiment had collapsible bicycles and could be truck-borne if necessary. The
artillery regiment had two motorized batteries and one pack battery. The division included a light
tank squadron. This semi-motorized division was designed primarily for warfare in terrain, which,
though mountainous, permitted the use of such units in a reconnaissance, exploitation or support role.
Armament was sacrificed to this end, and the division was not designed for defense. There were three
Celeri divisions. They were never used as envisioned. There was a Celeri corps during the invasion of
Yugoslavia, but it was kept in reserve. Later one division was sent to the Soviet Union, one was
robbed of its mobile artillery and kept in Yugoslavia in an anti-partisan role, and one was in the
process of conversion to an armored division. Not very favorable results for an organization formed
with such high hopes.
Armored Divisions
The Italians originally planned to have armored brigades as their largest armor units, but study of
the successful German panzer divisions encouraged them to form divisions. The armored division, as
designed before the war, was a mixture of light and medium tanks. It was incapable of more than light
assault. The Italian armored division changed radically in composition under German influence, with
improved tanks; the introduction of self-propelled guns and heavier divisional supporting weapons.
Composition - The armored division had a headquarters, one tank regiment of three battalions, a
truck-borne Bersaglieri regiment, one support and antitank battalion, one artillery regiment (six
batteries, two of which was self propelled.), one mixed engineer battalion, one supply section, and
one medical section. 6 AD’s were planned; only 2 and part of a third were formed. Planned for
deployment in Alps, France, and Yugoslavia, the divisions went to N. Africa and Soviet Union. The
armored divisions have often been misread. The one campaign for which they had really prepared, that
against Yugoslavia, the divisions were relatively successful. In the other campaigns the Italians
fought for losing causes. The armored divisions were the only mechanized elements of a barely
motorized army. They were lost fighting to support units that were hopelessly out of date on a
modern battlefield. It was not the failure of mechanization that doomed the armored divisions, but
the political-industrial failure to create at least a motorized army. Italy had neither the
industrial base nor the raw materials to be a major power in modern industrial war.
Airborne Divisions
Despite the fact that the Italians had experimented with parachutes just at the end of WWI, the Italian
military kept a skeptical attitude towards the practicality of deploying large airborne units on the
rough terrain, which constitutes the largest part of Italian territory. On the other hand, airdrops
were seen as means to infiltrate recon and sabotage teams behind enemy lines. German successes, and
the planned invasion of Malta, brought about a rethinking and formation of airborne divisions
consisting of a headquarters, two parachute infantry regiments, a parachute artillery regiment, a
parachute Guastatori battalion, and a signal company.
Two divisions saw service; one more was forming. The Air Force had “Loreto Battalion” and later
formed the “Arditi Distruttori” airborne assault battalion. It was later reconstituted as the
“Assault Regiment Duci d’ Acosta.” The airborne divisions were used as ordinary infantry.
Air Landing Divisions
The concept was for an infantry division to be specially trained and equipped for transportability
in aircraft. They were to disembark on airfields that had been secured by airborne troops. The 80th
"La Spezia" air landing division was the only infantry division so trained, and like the Italian
airborne divisions, it was formed with the sole aim of taking part in the invasion of Malta. As this
invasion never took place, the division ended up on the frontline, fighting as ordinary infantry,
and came to an end in Tunisia.
Coastal Divisions
The Italian Coastal divisions were hurriedly organized during 1943, when the Axis troops in Africa
were being crushed by the Allies, and an Allied invasion had to be expected at any time. They were
organized by grouping the troops of the Coastal Brigade sectors, some 80 Blackshirt battalions, 50
territorial battalions, and a hodge-podge of other units together. Some were given naval gun elements
to defend critical sectors of the Italian coast. There was no uniform organization, and as a
consequence of their hodge-podge nature, low-quality equipment and low morale, they fought badly.
Most saw no combat, however, as the armistice was reached before the Allies got anywhere near them.
There were 26 such divisions.
Depot Divisions
The Italian Depot divisions were much like the German Field Training (Feldersatz) divisions. They were
composed of the replacement battalions of the active regiments. They trained while being used for
garrison duty, mostly in Yugoslavia. This is likely why, in addition to having low priority in
equipment, they did so poorly against the partisans there. The 8th "March" Training division was
formed to consolidate replacements for the 8th Army, that campaigned in the USSR. There were 10 such
divisions.
