Regio Esercito, Conflict Between Theories of Employment Page 2
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| Attack and Pursuit |
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Italian ideas of attack and pursuit were much like those of any other modern army, though the emphasis placed on the offensive almost recalls the pre-1914 doctrines of the French Colonel de Grandmaison. The 1940 Italian doctrine provided that the attack was to be recklessly pressed, was never to halt, and was to “overcome the resistance with continuity of effort.” Initiative, violence and audacity were urged. As for the “continuity of effort,” one Greek tactical authority with much experience in the Albanian campaign against Italy declared that an obvious characteristic of all Italian attacks was their extreme brevity and the failure of officers rather than men to follow through. It became almost a proverb in the Greek army that an Italian attack was certain to flag after the first 20 minutes. A Greek unit, which had successfully sustained an attack for that length of time usually, felt that it had for all practical purposes already won. This was not, of course, what the Italian tacticians had taught. “The Italian military doctrine of the present,” wrote Major Umberto Mescia in 1939, “reaffirms the reasoning which was Caesar’s and Machiavelli’s; the offensive, because only the offensive can bring victory. There is a return to the Roman concept, to the Latin and Italian spirit, because those qualities which bring success-a sense of responsibility and the willingness to meet danger-are particularly Italian, manly in courage and daring in spirit, ready to overcome difficulties. To take the offensive means to attack, to go forward, to force one’s will on the enemy, and in this direction, the mental, moral, and material preparation of all is turned toward an ever greater formation of the offensive consciousness.” The actual performance of the Italian Army often fell somewhat short of this high standard.
| Defense |
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| The Italian teaching was that a commander should concentrate his firepower on such a position
whenever it is encountered. It was the Italian view that such action imposed on the commander
merely a temporary pause in a “position of arrest”---a mere lull in his sustained offensive
movement. Otherwise, Italian tactics discouraged any assumption of a static position. When the Italians were compelled to assume the defensive in a position of resistance, they hoped to resume the offensive at the earliest possible moment-a doctrine common to most armies. “Defense does not mean giving up the resumption of movement as soon as possible.” The main line of resistance was removed as far as possible from the enemy’s artillery fire, and the Italians endeavored to establish a “ zone of security” with a depth ranging from 2000 to 3500 yards. In this area, utilizing all footholds that the terrain may offer, they organized holding positions. These delivered long-range fire, especially along the easiest routes of penetration, with a view to wearing the enemy down before coming to grips with him. |
| Principles of Employment |
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INFANTRY
A. General- The Italian ideal of the employment of infantry presupposed the possibility of an attack
undivided into principal and auxiliary actions. Supposedly sufficient elasticity would be maintained
to direct the effort to those points where success appeared best assured upon initial contact.
B. Infantry division-The infantry division was the basic large combat unit. Its maneuverability was sacrificed to the development of increased attack capability and the ability to undertake deep penetration of enemy positions. It had a fixed table of organization and was considered to be an indivisible unit. Whenever its strength required increasing for accomplishing its mission, superior commands were expected to assign the required additional equipment and personnel.
C. The binary infantry division organization was adopted on the eve of war. It was born in the Ethiopian War and was to create a mobile infantry force in which one division would fix the enemy or begin to advance and the second division would bound forward to launch attack and/or push on. The binary infantry division was, by doctrine, supposed to be capable only of frontal attack. Manuever was the prerogative only of army corps. The divisions were to function as attack columns to create and exploit any tactical opportunity. Control both of the movement of individual divisions and of the medium caliber guns was retained by corps headquarters. This flaw should have been realized early in the attacks against France in 1940. Italian units dashed forward into the killing zone of French artillery and were stopped with cruel casualties. The Army Staff misinterpreted the failure and blamed inadequate artillery support rather than on an operational concept that assigned to poorly trained infantry tasks of offensive deep penetrations that no infantry in the world could accomplish in the face of an unshaken defense. In practice, superiority of numbers only produced superior numbers of dead, wounded or captured.
D. Motorized divisions were originally formed to work with an armored division. They also operated with the Celere divisions for strategic reconnaissance or as a general advance guard often preceded by a light and very fast force of motorcyclists, light tanks or other units on observation missions.
| Artillery |
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A. General-It was planned that Italian artillery be divided into echelons: the first to operate in direct support of the infantry battalions of the first echelon; the second to act generally as a reserve for the purpose of lateral extension of the line or depth. Depth in echelon was sought for the purpose of increasing shock and penetration, almost to the point of risking the maintenance of a sufficiently strong front.
B. Principles of employment:
(1) Prompt intervention in response to tactical necessities.
(2) Close co-operation with other arms.
(3) Violent action in mass and by surprise.
(4) Co-ordination of the action of the various artillery echelons in order that the effects of fire
produce the total results desired in the general concept of the battle, with a single final purpose-
that of facilitating the action of infantry.
(5) Elasticity of organization permitting not only the maneuvering of fire rapidly, but also the
following of the action and its support with the movement of the batteries, particularly when it
assumes a character of velocity.
(6) Artillery is useful only if the ammunition supply is assured.
(7) Observation is essential for artillery. This last mentioned principle was possibly the most
important, for to achieve observation at all times Italian artillery was often situated well forward
and resorted to direct laying far more frequently than other armed forces did.
C. Division artillery-The division artillery commander regulated the employment of artillery except in counterbattery and interdiction. Decentralization of command for these functions was designed to expedite rapid and effective action, and thus contribute to the desired war of movement.
D. Method of employment-The employment of artillery by the Italians was quite normal, and the only feature worthy of note was the tendency to site the bulk of their artillery well forward. Artillery personnel earned a reputation for good shooting and displayed considerable courage under heavy fire or in direct attack. In many cases artillery firing over open sights was used against attacking tank or infantry. In defensive situations roving pieces were sent far forward of the main defense area in order to force the enemy to deploy and to execute counterbattery fire Alpine artillerymen were highly skilled in the manhandling of pack artillery. The highly centralized Italian artillery actually did better than their German allies against Montgomery’s 1918 style “set-piece” tactics in North Africa.
E. The artillery arm was spread through out the army and was classified as divisional, corps, or army. There also existed ad hoc formations known as raggruppamenti (tactical organizations of flexible size and mission), which had no fixed establishment.
| Armed Forces |
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A. General-The Italian armored forces originated, like those of all other nations, from the infantry support role of the First World War. The use of armor was increased to include armored brigades tasked with penetration in the offense and the role of a mobile reserve to counter enemy penetrations in the defense. The development of armored divisions by other nations encouraged the Italians to evolve the tank brigades into armored divisions. As a result of their experience in Spain, the Italians recognized the need for motorized infantry and ordinary infantry to follow the tanks and consolidate conquered ground. There were two types of mechanized divisions in the Italian army, the fast moving, or light motorized division (Celere) and the armored division (Corazzata)
B.a. The Celere divisions were a combination of cavalry and Bersaglieri to produce a uniquely Italian unit of mobile troops. The concept was an outgrowth of the successful actions of cooperating cavalry and Bersaglieri in the long pursuits of the defeated Austrians at the end of WWI and the culmination of several trends in the use of the cavalry and the Bersaglieri. The chances wrought in the battlefield by the machine gun and the tank reduced the possible roles for both. The bicycle gave the Bersaglieri mobility comparable to horse cavalry. In general, the Celere division fulfilled the missions formerly assigned to cavalry, that is, reconnaissance and covering missions. In addition it had the mission of seizure of certain terrain features of strategic importance. Celere units were envisioned as flanking units and pursuit units. They were combined with motorized infantry and armored divisions making the breakthrough and with the alpine divisions covering the flanks, it was a formidable concept. This change in policy was quickly translated into doctrine.
b. In normal employment the division would be divided into two distinct groups. The cavalry, motorcyclists, and tanks would be used as a manuever element in operations requiring agility, while the truck-borne and bicycle-borne Bersaglieri, with the artillery provided a unit for use in conventional attack. The tanks in the Celeri units tended to be kept as a reserve and used in situations where covering forces ware required. Motorized detachments provided the best units for penetration of the enemy line and for rapid movement.
C. The armored division (Corazzata) was originally given the role of a mobile reserve to be used in the exploitation of success and to counter enemy penetrations. It could also engage in reconnaissance with mobile units, or in wide envelopment of an enemy flank, infiltration through gaps, or assault against hastily prepared defensive position. This cautious conception of the functions of the armored division underwent some modification as a result of the lessons of war, but Italian tank tactics and training were somewhat rudimentary until the armored divisions came under German command and German training and tactical doctrines were introduced. Since it was weak in inherent infantry, the armored division was organized and trained primarily to operate in conjunction with infantry, motorized, or celere divisions, It was not designed to operate ahead of the army in the seizure of important terrain, as the Italians assigned such missions to the motorized or celere divisions. The armored division was designed for the exploitation of a breakthrough and also to function as a mobile reserve to be thrown in to use its shock action and firepower to obtain a decision.
D Independent tank units of the Italian army were designed to serve primarily as a basic shock element and in support of the infantry arm. In this respect, reconnaissance missions were assigned as a particular task for light tanks.
E. The idea of three kinds of tank units appeared in the first set of manuals on the employment of tanks. One was for the normal infantry support role and a similarly organized but differently trained unit would support Celeri troops. The third was in the German inspired armored division. This divided the available tank resources between three streams of tactical development. Four if one considers the reconnaissance role often given tankette units.
| Cavalry |
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The principal missions of the Italian cavalry were that of reconnaissance, and in case of necessity, to exploit advantages, close gaps, etc. It maneuvered mounted and fought mounted or dismounted. Horse cavalry frequently acted as mounted infantry or as dismounted machine gun squadrons in support of other units. Most cavalry depots formed dismounted squadron groups, which were employed on coast or home defense, mainly in southern Italy and the Islands.
| Antiaircraft Artillery |
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The antiaircraft artillery militia was concentrated near more important and vulnerable industrial targets and the larger cities and communication centers.
| Coast Artillery |
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The coast artillery militia employed equipment furnished by the Navy for antiship and antiaircraft defense of localities in accordance with instructions issued by the office of the navy.
| Engineers |
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A. Under Italian doctrine, engineers were considered to be technical, rather than combat, troops. Engineer functions were conventional: work communications zones, erect of obstacles, clearance of obstacles, laying of minefields, water supply, and supply of engineer materials, Also, in the Italian army, the providing of signal communications and the supplying of hydrogen for captive balloons were engineer functions.
B. The success of the German Assault Engineers encouraged the formation of Assault Pioneers known as “Guastatori” (destroyers). These forces were organized into battalions. They were patterned after similar German units and the Assault Engineer School at Civitavecchia was organized by a German engineer, a Col. Steiner, in Mar ’40. The attacks by pioneers (Guastatori) were nearly always carried out at dawn, the objective having been approached during the night. Assault engineers were used against tanks at night. Personnel did not lay mines but were trained in removing them should they impede their progress.
| Camouflage |
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A. General-The Italians placed great emphasis on artificial camouflage and installations garnished with natural materials tied into the natural surroundings.
B. Field Camouflage-a. in Italian field camouflage, canvas, raffia, shavings and similar materials were colored with a spray gun, which was both quick and convenient as compared with the usual paintbrush method. This field spraying was done with compressed air in a special blower. The compressed air was furnished from a Shoulder-portable compressor of from compressed air tanks, periodically filled. Machine guns were camouflaged by being covered with wire netting stretched over a frame of iron rods.
C. Various devices-Individual nets---Individual camouflage nets were 1 to 80 m. square, with reinforced edges furnished with buttons and garnished with strips of sisal material colored with three shades of green and tow of maroon. Metal net supports-The metal frames for overhead cover were made in two sizes , with spans of 1.50m or 4 to 5 meters. Both types collapsed into compact bundles. Simulative cloaks- The simulative cloak was used by the Italian Army as an aid for the combatant who had to remain on observation duty or was required to advance under the eye of the adversary. A man disguised by such a cloak became invisible, even on barren ground and so could accomplish his mission unmolested, even at a short distance from the enemy. The cloak was easily made by the Italian soldier and was frequently produced even with improvised materials by the combatant himself. It consisted of a rectangular piece or burlap 1.8m long and 1.5m wide. The rectangle was folded along a line and sewn along the upper edge to form a hood easily worn by the soldier without hindering his freedom of movement. To blend readily with the surroundings, the cloak was covered with hay, grass, straw, etc, depending on what was available in the particular region, and on what background was to be imitated. This cloak could be used to conceal telegraph-line guards, men stationed near roads, liaison men, etc.
| Supply |
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In an effort to keep the combat divisions “slim and agile” a centralized “Intendenza” at Army level was given almost all of the few trucks available. The theory was to replenish Corps, Divisions, and even Regiments from the rear forward. The ‘War of Rapid Decision’ was totally divorced from existing Italian capabilities. The supply organization functioned adequately in slow-moving or static actions, but failed to support swift movement. Even mere relocation of a unit could sometime disrupt its supply chain. Supply was over centralized at army level, leaving forward units at the mercy of the vagaries of the Intendenza.
| Organization |
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HIGHER UNITS
ARMY GROUP AND ARMY Organization of army groups and armies varied considerably but the number of corps in an army rarely exceeded four. Army troops included heavy artillery and mechanized field artillery, mining, sound ranging, metrological and survey units.
ARMY CORPS Corps were composed of two to four infantry divisions, one motorized machinegun battalion (eventually to be expanded to a regiment.) one artillery regiment, one engineer regiment, one chemical company, one flame-thrower company, one chemical mortar battery, one medical company, one supply company, a motor transport center. Theoretically each corps had reconnaissance groups attached to it…motorized, infantry, and Air Force Reconnaissance Groups. These seldom materialized. Some army corps had tank battalions attached, and special units, such as Alpini, Bersaglieri, etc.
