| Background and Preparations |
a. The Italian armed forces were faced with a conflict between theories of employment. They had
historically been structured for deployment in the mountainous terrain found in Italy and her
immediate neighbors. These forces were forced to adapt themselves to a colonial role, and,
even more conflicting, to the “War of Rapid Decision.” These theories mixed about as well
as oil and water, and Italy lacked the industrial power and the raw materials to field
forces able to meet all these needs. She even lacked the means to be a major power in a
modern industrial war.
b. All Italy’s plans and preparations had been made for war against Germany/Austria, France,
and Yugoslavia. Industry and trade had traditional ties with Britain, France, and the U.S.
This was so prevalent that the geography section of the officer’s qualifying exam (tests prior
to consideration for promotion) included the border areas with France, Switzerland, Austria,
and Yugoslavia. The characteristics of the armies of these nations were also covered. Africa
was ignored.
c. One faction of the army wanted an alpine oriented army. In a 1937 conference on the future
of armor, a ranking general said, “The tank is a powerful tool, but let us not idolize it;
let us reserve our reverence for the infantryman and the mule.” This group saw “Men, our
indisputable resource,” not machines. They came close to the philosophy of French Col. de
Grandmaison and believed in “mind over matter.” This meant that the solution for any tactical
problem was a mass of infantry.
d. Architect of the mechanized concept was Gen Federico Baistrocchi (CoS during Ethiopia.
Gen Alberto Pariani succeeded him. This faction developed an innovative theory of manuever
warfare in restrictive terrain. The “La Guerra di Rapido Corso” was adopted as doctrine in
1938. These men then found themselves in charge of an army that was not organized, equipped,
or trained for the type of warfare envisioned. They found themselves in charge of an army wherein
a large percentage of senior officers opposed the accepted doctrine. They also found themselves
in charge of an army with its reserve officers lacking any training and experience in the new
doctrine.
A. General-A “war of rapid decision” was intended. Its chief features were supposed to be-
1) Celeri divisions, designed for exploitation and reconnaissance.
2) Tank brigades, designed for penetration, encirclement, and exploitation.
3) Motorized divisions, designed for rapid manuever over a wide range and for the reinforcement of
mechanized or fast moving units. This new doctrine emphasized that surprise, speed, intensity,
sustained action, and flexibility of plan allowing for unforeseen contingencies were the basic
factors for a successful action.
B. Main policies-In an effort to obtain the requirements for victory, the Italian combat effort was
to become predicated upon the following policies:
(1) Enormously increased firepower.
(2) Opposition to hostile fire by combined fire and movement.
(3) Direction of fire mass against the sector of least resistance to achieve rapid penetration and
to permit subsequent flanking movement.
(4) Simultaneous fire and movement with supporting artillery fire to neutralize enemy effort.
(5) Substantially independent exercise of command except as regards reserve employment and
artillery support.
C. Comparison of doctrines-Italian doctrine denied manuever at division level and instead expected
manuever to be controlled by corps and armies. This was even more unusual because great stress was
placed on manuever and initiative by lower units. Earlier doctrine placed its trust in numbers.
Doctrine proclaimed the absolute primacy of the infantry, but did stress the necessity of
infantry-artillery integration. Armor was envisioned as an infantry support weapon. Light
tanks were to operate with horse cavalry squadrons. The new idea of the decisive war, a war
of manuever using flanking attacks rather than frontal assault, pointed toward major changes
in the future. The concept was one of rapid advance by truck or bicycle-borne infantry hordes,
backed by road-bound artillery and 3.5-ton tankettes.
D. Doctrine- A 1938 circular signaled the adoption of this doctrine of high-speed mobile warfare as
the official strategic and tactical concept of the Italian army. La Guerra di Rapido Corso (the war
of rapid course) would be a war of manuever, using what Liddell Hart had called the strategy of the
indirect approach. The army would manuever against the flank of the enemy. Mechanized and airborne
weapons would be important aspects of war. Exploitation by motorized forces would follow the use
of the maximum mass available to break the enemy line. Weaknesses of equipment and fuel would
prevent this doctrine from being fully effective.
A primary element of the Italian doctrine was the combined employment of various arms, particularly
infantry and artillery. Italian infantry was designed to be used in small, flexible, highly
maneuverable units of great firepower. Each forward echelon, upon achieving a breakthrough was
followed by reinforcements for purposes of exploitation. Mobility and maneuverability comprised
the fundamental characteristics of Italian artillery. Closely allied to the artillery’s mission
to support the infantry were the secondary missions of engaging in counterbattery firing and of
providing antitank protection. Cavalry manuever was mounted, but combat could have been mounted or
dismounted. Mechanization of the cavalry resulted in increased mobility and firepower. This added,
for the first time, the element of fire mass to the common cavalry missions of reconnaissance and
exploitation. Italian engineers, although armed, were more concerned with normal engineer functions
and less concerned with combat than in other modern armies. Chief features were: fast moving
divisions, designed for exploitation and reconnaissance; tank brigades, designed for penetration,
encirclement, and exploitation, and motorized divisions, designed for rapid movement over a wide
range and for the reinforcement of mechanized or fast moving units. Surprise, speed, intensity,
sustained action and flexibility of plan allowing for unforeseen contingencies were seen as the
basic factors for a successful action. Staff studies and war plans laid very little stress on the
defensive, the assumption being that an offensive against its soldiers was a remote possibilities.
It was discovered that applying theories was somewhat more difficult than developing them.
Organization was, however, based upon this “Rapid Decision” doctrine.
| Reconnaissance and Intelligence |
Intelligence was a relatively neglected aspect of operational planning, and commanders in the field
tended to make insufficient use of intelligence resources. Until 1941, the army failed to recognize
the need for specialized reconnaissance units to ensure surprise, to avoid it from the enemy, and
to find opportunities to exploit. Italian units lacked armored cars with radios to keep commanders
appraised on the locations and activities of enemy units. Air Force reconnaissance support was poorly
coordinated.
The Italians aimed at security through offense and penetration. Intelligence, camouflage, and similar
means of attaining security were regarded as preliminaries to offensive penetration. Security
measures were not merely supposed to guard against surprise by the enemy, but were also supposed to
be so planned as to enable the Italian commander to inflict upon the enemy a surprise of his own.
Italian leaders were urged not to let security measures betray them into undue caution, which might
slow up the forward drive of an action. On the contrary, daring was thought to be quite as important
as security. Nevertheless the Italians kept a somewhat greater distance between the advance guard
and main body than the German did.
A. General-Meeting engagements, as distinct from mere preliminary engagements or patrol activities to
test the enemy’s strength a and determine his weak points, were regarded by the Italians as a matter
of rapid aggressive action. It was believed such engagements would occur only in the case of
relatively small forces, for Italian military theory denied the possibility of surprise in modern
warfare, at least on any considerable scale. The Italians ‘did not admit that a sudden and unplanned
clash could occur between sizable forces.” In other words they expected proper reconnaissance to
always reveal the presence of large enemy units.
B. Doctrine-The Italians believed that their system successfully combined the best features of both
French and German tactics. It was supposed to provide for “both conceptions-planned collision and
swift and precise intervention with decidedly aggressive behavior.” The commander was urged to “take
the initiative in operations and attack with decision, seeking victory in swiftness of movements in
direction, in immediacy and power of impact.”
